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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this case, a defendant and a nonparty deponent were 
held in contempt of court, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 37(b), for failing to appear at their respective 
depositions. As one of the sanctions imposed, the district 
court took as established certain facts relating to both the 
defendant and nonparty deponent. The issue we confront 
on appeal is whether the district court abused its discretion 
in holding the defendant and the nonparty deponent in 
contempt and in fashioning sanctions with respect to its 
contempt order. 
 
We will hold that the district court abused its discretion 
in holding the defendant in contempt for failure to appear 
because the plaintiff failed to set a time and place for his 
deposition, as required by the district court's order. We 
further find that the district court did not err in holding the 
nonparty deponent in contempt, inasmuch as he failed to 
attend a scheduled deposition. However, we conclude that 
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the district court abused its discretion in sanctioning the 
nonparty deponent by binding him to the established facts. 
As a result, we will remand to the district court so it may 
reconsider appropriate sanctions consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
I. 
 
The Underlying Action 
 
In 1994, Appellee General Insurance Company of 
America sued John L. Daddona ("Daddona"), Eastern 
Consolidated Utilities, Inc., Mid-Atlantic Pipeline, Inc., 
Eastern Excavating, Inc., Judy Daddona, Frank P. Daddona 
and Katherine M. Daddona. Daddona and the other 
defendants had executed an indemnity agreement and 
other agreements in which they essentially promised to 
reimburse General for potential losses arising from its 
issuance of certain bonds connected to several construction 
projects. The contractor, and the principal on the bonds, 
was defendant Eastern Consolidated Utilities, Inc., a 
company affiliated with Daddona. General had lost several 
million dollars as a result of issuing those bonds. 
 
Daddona employed extraordinary delaying tactics during 
pre-judgment discovery. As a result, the court, by Order 
filed May 10, 1995, granted a motion compelling Daddona 
to submit to a deposition and produce documents. After the 
deposition, General moved for summary judgment on all of 
its claims in the amount of $3,993,566.96 against Daddona 
and certain of the other defendants (Eastern Consolidated 
Utilities, Inc., Mid-Atlantic Pipeline, Inc., Eastern 
Excavating, Inc. and Judy Daddona). Final judgment was 
entered on August 30, 1995, against these defendants. 
Prior to entry of judgment, General settled with the 
remaining defendants, Frank P. Daddona and Katherine M. 
Daddona, and the case was dismissed as to them. 
 
General sought postjudgment discovery because the 
judgment remained unsatisfied. Daddona has neither 
appealed the judgment nor sought a stay of enforcement. 
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Enforcement of the Judgment 
 
On November 21, 1995, in aid of its enforcement of the 
judgment, General took the deposition of Charles Hair, an 
attorney Daddona retained to incorporate various entities. 
Daddona was given notice of the deposition, but did not 
attend. Hair testified that he incorporated Five-Star, Ltd.; 
Par-3, Ltd.; D.G. Holding, Inc.; The Master at Shepherd 
Hills, Inc.; and The Golf Course at Shepherd Hills, Inc. He 
also testified that Five-Star was owned in three equal 
shares by Gubitosi, the Culnen Family Trust and the Dadd 
Partnership. The Dadd Partnership was owned in equal 
parts by Daddona and his two brothers. Five-Star owned 
100% of the shares in Par-3, Ltd. Five-Star also owned 85% 
of the shares in D.G. Holding, Inc.; The Dadd Partnership 
owned 10% and Gubitosi 5% of the remainder. D.G. 
Holding, in turn, owned The Masters at Shepherd Hills, Inc. 
and The Golf Course at Shepherd Hills, Inc. Together, Par- 
3, Ltd. and D.G. Holding, Inc. operated a golf course and 
country club known as Shepherd Hills. Hair also testified 
that he had owned 5% of D.G. Holding which he later 
transferred to Gubitosi. Hair's testimony was limited to the 
events surrounding the incorporation of these entities; he 
did not purport to describe their current ownership 
structure. 
 
General also noticed Daddona's deposition. The notice 
demanded certain documents and designated November 21, 
1995, as the date for the deposition. Daddona did not 
provide the requested documents and did not attend the 
deposition. General then moved for an order compelling 
Daddona to comply with the notice. On January 19, 1996, 
the district court, apparently pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 37(a)(2) and (4), granted General's motion 
and ordered Daddona to pay a sanction of $100 by 
February 5, 1996 and to attend his deposition "at a time 
and place designated by Plaintiff within thirty (30) days 
. . . ." General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Eastern Consol. Utils., Inc. 
et al., slip op. at 1, dated January 19, 1996 (No. 94-4388) 
(A. at 1). General never sent a letter setting a date for a 
deposition and Daddona never attended one. 
 
Appellant David M. Gubitosi, Daddona's business 
partner, was not a defendant in the underlying action and 
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became involved only after judgment was entered. Seeking 
to acquire information concerning Daddona's business 
interests, General served Gubitosi with a subpoena on 
December 29, 1995. The subpoena called for Gubitosi's 
deposition and document production on January 10, 1996. 
 
On January 4, 1996, General's attorneys wrote to 
Gubitosi's attorney, John P. Karoly, Jr. to confirm this 
plan. Because of bad weather, however, it was mutually 
agreed that the deposition would be briefly delayed. Karoly 
failed to respond to telephone calls regarding a new date. 
General then wrote a letter, dated February 2, 1996, to 
suggest new dates. Gubitosi failed to respond. As a result, 
upon General's motion pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(e), the 
district court found Gubitosi to be in contempt and ordered 
him to produce documents and attend his deposition "at a 
time and place designated by plaintiff, within 30 days of the 
date of this Order."1 General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Eastern 
Consol. Utils., Inc. et al., slip op. at 2, dated May 15, 1996 
(No. 94-4388) (emphasis in original) (A. at 4). 
 
On May 22, 1996, General wrote to John P. Karoly, Jr., 
Gubitosi's attorney, designating June 3, 1996, as the date 
for his deposition. Gubitosi then fired Karoly and hired a 
new attorney, James L. Heidecker. (He later replaced 
Heidecker with Karoly). Heidecker requested and received a 
brief adjournment. On June 17, 1996, General sent a letter 
to Heidecker regarding the contempt order and the 
deposition. Neither Heidecker nor Gubitosi responded. 
 
General wrote to Heidecker again on June 25, 1996, and 
designated July 31, 1996, as the new date for the 
deposition. Gubitosi requested yet another adjournment, 
and General wrote again on July 23, 1996, designating July 
24 as the date for document production and August 15 as 
the date for the deposition. But Gubitosi did not produce 
any documents by the 24th. By letter dated July 29, 1996, 
General informed Gubitosi that if the documents were not 
produced by July 31, 1996, the deposition would not go 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Rule 45(e) (1996) provides in relevant part:"Contempt. Failure by any 
person without adequate excuse to obey a subpoena served upon that 
person may be deemed a contempt of the court from which the subpoena 
issued." 
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forward and another motion for sanctions would be 
presented to the court. On August 15, Gubitosi arrived at 
the offices of General's lawyer, claiming that he was there 
for the deposition; however, General had canceled the 
deposition, and General's attorneys were not present 
because it had not received the requested documents by 
July 31, 1996. Thus, once again, the deposition did not go 
forward. 
 
On August 16, 1996, General, pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 37(b), requested the district court to 
issue an order declaring Daddona to be in contempt for 
failure to obey the Order dated January 19, 1996, and 
directing him to attend his deposition and produce 
documents by February 19, 1996; declaring Gubitosi to be 
in contempt for failure to obey the Order dated May 15, 
1996, and directing him to attend his deposition and to 
produce documents by June 15, 1996; requiring Daddona 
and Gubitosi to pay $500 each to General for its expenses 
and attorney's fees; and declaring the following facts (which 
were drawn from Hair's deposition) to be established as 
against both Daddona and Gubitosi: 
 
       (i) Five-Star Holding, Limited (a/k/a Five-Star Ltd.), 
       D.G. Holding, Inc. (a/k/a D.G. Holding, Inc.), Par-3, 
       Ltd., The Masters at Shepherd Hills, Inc. and The Golf 
       Course at Shepherd Hills, Inc. are all Pennsylvania 
       corporations; 
 
       (ii) Gubitosi, the Dadd Partnership and [Culnen] 
       Family Trust each own one third of the shares of stock 
       in Five-Star Limited; 
 
       (iii) Five-Star Limited owns 85% of the shares of stock 
       in D.G. Holding, Inc., the Dadd Partnership owns 10% 
       and Gubitosi owns 5%; 
 
       (iv) Five-Star Limited owns 100% of the shares of 
       stock in Par-3, Ltd.; 
 
       (v) D.G. Holding, Inc., owns 100% of the shares of 
       stock in The Masters at Shepherd Hills, Inc. and the 
       Golf Course at Shepherd Hills, Inc.; 
 
       (vi) The Dadd Partnership is a Pennsylvania 
       partnership; and 
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       (vii) Judgment debtor Daddona owns, either 
       individually or jointly with judgment debtor Judy 
       Daddona, a one third interest in the Dadd Partnership, 
       Donald A. Daddona owns, either individually or jointly 
       with Eva Daddona, a one third interest and Frank P. 
       Daddona owns, either individually or jointly with 
       Katherine Daddona, a one third interest. 
 
S.A. at 27-28. 
 
General's motion was granted in its entirety by an Order 
filed August 28, 1996. 
 
II. 
 
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1331. A postjudgment order of contempt as to a party is 
final, so long as the district court has completely disposed 
of the matter. Sportmart, Inc. v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 
601 F.2d 313 (7th Cir. 1979); see Cromaglass Corp. v. 
Ferm, 500 F.2d 601 (3d Cir. 1974) (order establishing facts 
pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2) as to some claims is not final 
order if it does not adjudicate all claims in complaint); see 
also Ohntrup v. Firearms Center, Inc., 802 F.2d 676 (3d Cir. 
1986) (quoting Sportmart approvingly). Here, the district 
court granted General's motion in its entirety, and thereby 
disposed of all of General's postjudgment discovery 
requests. Thus, the order is final as to Daddona. An order 
for contempt or expenses against a nonparty, such as 
Gubitosi, is immediately appealable. United States Catholic 
Conf. v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72, 76 
(1988) ("The right of a nonparty to appeal an adjudication 
of contempt cannot be questioned."); United States v. 
Bertoli, 994 F.2d 1002, 1012 (3d Cir. 1993). Thus, we have 
jurisdiction to hear this final order as to both Daddona and 
Gubitosi pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
III. 
 
Daddona and Gubitosi argue that the district court 
abused its discretion in holding them in contempt and in 
fashioning its sanctions. Specifically, the district court held, 
pursuant to Rule 37(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
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Procedure ("Failure to Make Disclosure or Cooperate in 
Discovery: Sanctions"), that (1) Daddona was "in contempt 
of Court for failure to obey this Court's Order dated 
January 19, 1996, directing him to pay a sanction of $100, 
attend his deposition and produce documents by February 
19, 1996;" and (2) Gubitosi was "in contempt of Court for 
failure to obey this Court's Order dated May 15, 1996, 
directing him to attend his deposition and to produce 
documents by June 15, 1996." Order, filed August 28, 
1996, at 1. Daddona and Gubitosi argue that because they 
did not receive proper notice of their depositions, the 
court's finding of contempt and imposition of sanctions 
were improper.2 
 
We review the granting of a motion for sanctions for 
failing to comply with a Rule 37 discovery order for abuse 
of discretion. Quality Prefabrication, Inc. v. Daniel J. Keating 
Co., 675 F.2d 77, 78 (3d Cir. 1982); see Petrucelli v. 
Bohringer and Ratzinger, GMBH, 46 F.3d 1298, 1310 (3d 
Cir. 1995) ("We apply the abuse of discretion standard 
when reviewing orders regarding the scope and conduct of 
discovery."). 
 
Rule 37(b) ("Failure to Comply With Order") provides in 
relevant part: 
 
       (1) Sanctions by Court in District Where 
       Deposition is Taken. If a deponent fails to be sworn or 
       to answer a question after being directed to do so by 
       the court in the district in which the deposition is 
       being taken, the failure may be considered a contempt 
       of that court. 
 
       (2) Sanctions by Court in Which Action is Pending. 
       If a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of 
       a party or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 
       31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an 
       order to provide or permit discovery, including an order 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Appellants also argue that the Order violates their right to "due 
process" (presumably that which is guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment). 
Appellants' Br. at 18. Because of the result we reach, we need not decide 
that issue as to Daddona, and because we find that Gubitosi had proper 
notice, his due process claim is without merit. 
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       made under subdivision (a) of this rule or Rule 35, or 
       if a party fails to obey an order entered under Rule 
       26(f), the court in which the action is pending may 
       make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, 
       and among others the following: 
 
        (A) An order that the matters regarding which the 
       order was made or any other designated facts shall be 
       taken to be established for the purposes of the action 
       in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the 
       order; . . . 
 
        (D) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in 
       addition thereto, an order treating as a contempt of 
       court the failure to obey any orders except an order to 
       submit to a physical or mental examination; . . . 
 
       In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition 
       thereto, the court shall require the party failing to obey 
       the order or the attorney advising that party or both to 
       pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, 
       caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the 
       failure was substantially justified or that other 
       circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b) (1996). 
 
The Appellants argue that "Daddona received no notice at 
all and Appellee General admits that there was no 
deposition even scheduled." Appellants' Br. at 13. It is 
undisputed, both in the briefs and at oral argument, that 
General never scheduled a deposition after the court issued 
its January 19, 1996 Order, and our review of the record 
leads us to the same conclusion. Thus, we hold that 
Daddona did not violate the express terms of that Order 
because General never set a time and place for a 
deposition. While it is clear from the record that Daddona 
has engaged in extraordinary delaying tactics, he did not 
violate the terms of that particular Order. 
 
Appellants also argue that Gubitosi "had previously 
appeared for a deposition that had been unilaterally 
canceled without notice." Id. at 14. Here, the record does 
not support the Appellants' position. General wrote to 
Gubitosi's attorney on July 23, 1996, designating July 24 
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as the date of document production and August 15 as the 
date of the deposition. Gubitosi did not produce any 
documents by July 24. By letter dated July 29, 1996, 
General informed Gubitosi that if the documents were not 
produced by July 31, 1996, the deposition would not go 
forward and another motion for sanctions would be 
presented to the court. On August 15, Gubitosi arrived at 
the offices of General's lawyer and stated that he was there 
for the deposition. Of course, by then General had canceled 
the deposition because it had not received the requested 
documents by July 31, 1996. Thus, the deposition did not 
go forward. 
 
The July 29 letter provided Gubitosi notice that the 
deposition would be canceled if he failed to comply with the 
document production request. Moreover, the Order 
indicated that document production was to occur "at a time 
and place designated by" General. A. at 4 (emphasis in 
original). Gubitosi, therefore, violated the express terms of 
the May 15, 1996 Order. 
 
Pursuant to Rule 37(b), the district court again declared 
Gubitosi in contempt in its August 28 Order. The court 
held that the Established Facts were binding on him (and 
Daddona) and ordered him to pay General's expenses and 
Attorney's fees.3 
 
The district court did not specify whether it was acting 
pursuant to 37(b)(1) or (2). On its face, however, Rule 
37(b)(2) applies only to parties, and we have found no case 
that has applied Rule 37(b)(2) to a nonparty.4 We conclude 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The Appellants argue that the district court only had authority to 
issue an order punishing a party or nonparty for failing to attend a 
deposition pursuant to Rule 37(d). They are mistaken. 
 
Gubitosi could be sanctioned pursuant to Rule 37(b)(1), which grants 
a district court the authority to punish a nonparty for failing to follow 
the court's directions. See Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 709 F.2d 
524, 531 (9th Cir. 1983) (noting that Rule 37(b)(1) sanctions may be 
available against nonparty deponent who fails to appear at deposition). 
Moreover, on its face, Rule 37(d) applies only to parties. 
 
If Daddona had violated the January 19 Order, the court had the 
authority to sanction him under both Rule 37(b)(2) and Rule 37(d). 
 
4. Rule 37(b)(2) does allow limited sanctions to be imposed upon a 
party's attorney. 
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that Rule 37(b)(1) provides the appropriate means to 
sanction a nonparty. See Miller v. Transamerican Press, 
Inc., 709 F.2d 524, 531 (9th Cir. 1983) (noting that Rule 
37(b)(1) sanctions may be available against nonparty 
deponent who fails to appear at deposition); see also 7 
Moore's Federal Practice S 37.40 (3d Ed. 1997) ("[O]nly Rule 
37(b)(1), governing a deponent's failure to be sworn or to 
answer a question after being directed to do so by the 
court, applies to nonparties. Rule 37(b)(2), governing all 
other failures to obey discovery orders, does not apply to 
nonparties."); 9 Moore's Federal Practice S 45.04[7] (3d Ed. 
1997) ("Rule 37(b) sanctions are in their nature usually 
applicable to parties."). 
 
The only sanction available under Rule 37(b)(1) is to hold 
a deponent in contempt of court. The record indicates that 
Gubitosi engaged in extraordinary dilatory tactics regarding 
his deposition and failed to comply with the clear 
requirements of the May 15 Order. Thus, we conclude that 
the district court did not abuse its discretion infinding that 
Gubitosi was in contempt of court. See Richmark Corp. v. 
Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(upholding finding of contempt pursuant to Rule 37 where 
party failed to comply with court's order to allow discovery). 
 
We also find that the court did not abuse its discretion 
when it required Gubitosi to pay $500 to General for its 
expenses and attorney's fees, caused by his failure to 
comply with the May 15, 1996 Order. See Robin Woods Inc. 
v. Woods, 28 F.3d 396, 400 (3d Cir. 1994) (requiring party 
found to be in contempt for violating injunction to pay 
opposing party's attorney's fees). 
 
Nonetheless, we find that the district court abused its 
discretion when it purported to bind Gubitosi to the 
Established Facts. As the Supreme Court explained in 
Insurance Corp. v. Compagnie Des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694, 
705 (1982), Rule 37(b)(2) "embodies the standard[s] 
established in Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 
322 (1909), for the due process limits on" rules providing 
for discovery sanctions. Those "two standards -- one 
general and one specific -- . . . limit a district court's 
discretion. First, any sanction must be `just'; second, the 
sanction must be specifically related to the particular 
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`claim' which was at issue in the order to provide 
discovery." 456 U.S. at 707. Thus, a court, under Rule 
37(b)(2)A, cannot direct that designated facts be taken as 
true when those facts are unrelated to the claim or defense 
with respect to which the discovery is being sought. Rule 
37(b)(2)A; Wright & Miller, 8A Federal Practice & Procedure, 
S 2283. 
 
As we have noted, Rule 37(b)(2) on its face applies only to 
sanctions against parties. Rules 37(b)(1) and 45(e), which 
allow a court to treat the failure of a non-party under 
subpoena to provide discovery as a contempt, do not 
provide for a sanction comparable to the one authorized by 
Rule 37(b)(2)A and, in light of Hammond Packing, we believe 
that omission was advertent. A non-party, by definition, is 
not a participant in the litigation and, when a non-party 
refuses to provide discovery, no claim has been asserted by 
or against it. Accordingly, we believe that neither Rule 
37(b)(1) nor Rule 45(e) was intended to authorize an order 
that would effectively preclude a non-party from asserting 
in the future a claim that has not yet been made. 
 
The district court's order in this case states only that 
Gubitosi will be bound by certain facts. It does not, in 
conformity with Rule 37(b)(2)(A), contain the limitation "for 
the purposes of the action." Even if we assume, however, 
that the district court's order was intended to bind Gubitosi 
only in the course of further proceedings to collect the 
judgment against Dadonna in this action, we would 
nevertheless conclude that the order was not authorized by 
Rule 37(b)(1) or Rule 45(e). The only effect that we can 
perceive as possibly intended by the order in this context 
would be preclusion of Gubitosi from asserting any claim of 
ownership of a present interest in property levied upon that 
would be inconsistent with the stipulated facts. Since such 
a claim would not have been the subject of the pending 
litigation or the discovery sought, we cannot uphold the 
district court's sanction order in its current form. 
 
IV. 
 
For the reasons discussed above, we will reverse the 
order of the district court to the extent it holds plaintiff 
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Daddona in contempt. As to the nonparty deponent, 
Gubitosi, we will affirm the order of the district court 
holding him in contempt, but remand so that the court may 
fashion appropriate sanctions consistent with this opinion.5 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 5. On remand, the district court should ensure that it documents its 
reasons for finding Gubitosi in contempt, the type of contempt applicable 
(civil or criminal) and its rationale for the particular sanctions that it 
ultimately imposes. See generally Harris v. City of Philadelphia, 47 F.3d 
1311 (3d Cir. 1995).  
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